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Large Lot Zoning
Twenty years ago the typical new metropolitan dwelling was an
apartment or a house built on a small lot. Even in prestigious suburbs,
the well-to-do often placed their expensive homes on lots much
smaller than one half acre.' Today, on most undeveloped land around
large cities, minimum lot-size zoning prohibits all development save
single-family dwellings on lots that are very large by traditional stan-
dards.2 Even by 1960, of the vacant land zoned for residential use
within fifty miles of Times Square, eighty per cent was off limits to
apartments or houses on lots of less than one half acre. More than half
was zoned for single-family dwellings on lots of not less than one acre,
and minimum required lot sizes ranged up to five acres.8
For a metropolis as large as New York, large lot zoning has meant
that several million fewer people can live in the suburbs closer to the
city. Bidding up housing prices wherever they go, those excluded
further crowd the central city or move to the outer edges of the com-
muter belt where zoning is typically more lenient. They consume land
much faster than they would under free market conditions; 4 and their
dispersion increases expenditures on expressways and reduces the
1. REGIONAL PLAN ASSOCIATION, SPRaD CITY 13 (1962) [hereinafter cited as SPREADCITY]. Past development in Connecticut accommodated approximately three families perresidential acre. AMERICAN SOCIETY OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONNEarl.CUT PLANNING LEGISLATION 186 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ASPO]. Subdivisions built Inthe late forties and early fifties typically placed 5 dwellings on each acre. SPREAD CITY44; ASPO 185 n.l. In the late forties, zoning for lot sizes bigger than one acre wasextremely rare. Urban Land Institute, The Effects of Large Lot Site Zoning on Resi-
dential Development, 32 TECH. Buu. 7 (1958).
2. See SPREAD Crrv 11-15; ASPO 184-92; Babcock & Bosselhan, Suburban Zoning andthe Apartment Boom, 111 U. PA. L. REv. 1040, 1059-62 (1963).3. These figures are derived from data for 1960 contained in SPREAD CITY at 40, forthe "inner" and "intermediate" ring of suburbs, including roughly those within fiftymiles of Times Square. Data was not provided for the central city, but vacant land there
is scarce. Id. at 9.
The fraction of this suburban land zoned for one acre or more may now be overtwo thirds, since widespread, substantial increases in lot size requirements have beenreported since 1960. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1967, at 1, col. 3. See also ASPO 191, 197; 3NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMs, Report 1-43 (prelim. ed. 1968) [this reportof the commission chaired by former Senator Paul Douglas is hereinafter cited asDOUGLAS]. Moreover, more leniently zoned land gets developed at a much faster rate.
SPREAD CITY 15.
In Connecticut in 1966, of the undeveloped land zoned for a minimum lot size, ap-proximately 70% had acreage requirements of more than one acre, while less than 5%was zoned for one third of an acre or less. ASPO 186-87. Data on areas other thanConnecticut and the New York metropolitan region suggests an only slightly less ad-vanced trend toward large lot zoning. 3 DOUGLAS 1-43 to 1-44.4. Assuming that, in the New York City region, population grows by 40% and presentzoning remains unchanged from its 1960 level, " wje would use up in the next twenty-five years more land than we have developed in the 336 years since Manhattan waspurchased from the Indians." Id. at 1-21.
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feasibility of mass transportation. Many observers see the results as a
bifurcated society, aesthetic atrocities,5 and an inexcusable waste of re-
sources.
An inquiry into the desirability of curbing large lot zoning presents
grave difficulties because complex and often intangible factors must
be considered. Economic analysis can refine the debate by isolating
those factors reducible to dollar terms and by determining whether a
new policy's dollar benefits exceed its dollar costs. A reform in large
lot zoning would be "efficient" if the dollar value placed upon the
change by those whom it would benefit exceeds the negative dollar
value placed upon the change by those whom it would harm.
0
Changes in acreage requirements cause dollar gains and losses
chiefly by altering the characteristics of residences and neighborhoods.
Residents of the metropolis reduce such effects to dollar terms when
they shop for an apartment or home. Precisely how they would value
various minimum lot size requirements is unknown, but enough can be
surmised to suggest that substantial reductions in lot size requirements
would often be efficient. The purpose of this Note is to show the con-
ditions under which such a reform would be efficient, and then to pro-
pose an approach to lot-size zoning which can lead to more efficient
use of metropolitan residential land.
I. Is Large Lot Zoning Efficient?
We begin by hypothesizing a suburb with a substantial amount of
undeveloped land on the market for which the suburb will choose a
single minimum lot size. The analysis will consider the dollar costs
and benefits to three groups-present suburban residents ("home-
owners"'), potential suburban residents ("homebuyers"), and other
residents of the city ("citydwellers").8
5. Cf. W.H. WHYrE, THF LAsr LANDSCAPE 16-17, 199ff. (1968).
6. Because of non-monetizable considerations, a reform is not necessarily desirable
simply because it is economically effident. See pp. 14.0-31 infra.
7. Use of the term "homeowners" does not imply an assumption that all suburban
residents own their own homes. The relevant interests of those who now rent their
residences are alike in nature, if not in degree, to the interests of those who actually
own homes. Therefore it is not misleading in the analysis of efficiency to treat all
residents of the suburb as "homeowners."
8. The analysis treats the question of a reform's efliciency in terms of the comparative
interestd of these three classes. But any policy change, in zoning or otherwise, affects a
multitude of interests in the economy. For instance, a reform will have some small
impact on the prices of roof shingles and tar by altering somewhat the proportion of
apartment buildings and single family dvellings constructed. To treat all these effects
separately would bury in impossible complications any attempts to fathom the economy.
A comprehensible analysis is possible through the technique of "partial equilibrium
1419
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Present law authorizes suburbs to zone, and homeowners alone con-
trol the suburb's decisions.9 Thus one may expect that, absent judicial
intervention, 0 the zoning decisions of the suburb will reflect only the
homeowners' interests." These interests involve the numbers and the
sorts of people who will move to the suburbs. Fewer new neighbors
mean less noise, less traffic, and more open space. By increasing the
distance between new homes and existing ones, larger lot size zoning
gives the homeowners many of the advantages of their owning larger
lots without the attendant cost. Many homeowners also want to exclude
families of an economic status lower than their own, perhaps on the
assumption that poorer or darker-skinned neighbors will hinder the
education of their children, commit more crime, or make living in
analysis." The idea is to isolate that part of the economic system where the most sig-
nifcan onsequences of the phenomenon to be studied take place, and to treat everything
else as "remaining equal." The primary justification for this ceteribus paribus assump-
tion is that the relatively small consequences of any change tend to balance each other
out. Therefore, in a partial equilibrium analysis one may disregard some of the
consequences of a policy where there is good reason to believe that they either are small,
or are large but in fact balance each other out.
Large lot zoning affects people within the metropolis in ways connected with their
dwelling places-e.g., the rent or purchase price, the expense of ground maintenance
and commutation, the amenity of the neighborhood. Lot size zoning also affects people
in other connections; for example, by altering the distribution of purchasing power
between city and suburb, it will enhance one retailer's sales at the expense of another's.
But it does not affect significantly the total spent; one man's gain is likely to equal
another's loss, and therefore neither requires consideration. It seems reasonable to sup-
pose that all non-residence-connected, quantifiable effects either are of this character or
are too small to be considered. The question of relative efficiency, then, boils down to
that of whether the residence-connected benefits of a change in large lot zoning will out-
weigh its residence-connected costs. It is for this reason that te three categories used
in the analysis are defined in terms of common residence-connected interests.
9. Homeowners (including renters, see note 7 supra) may own so much vacant land
that they will vote their interests as landowners rather than their interests as home-
owners. The interests of landowners are generally opposed to those of homeowners, see
note 20 infra. But, because voting is per head and not per acre, and because the typical
undeveloped lot is far larger than the typical developed lot, non-landowning home-
owners will constitute a majority well before the suburb is half developed. That farmer-
landowners are a substantial voting bloc in outer areas may help explain why these
areas tend to zone for smaller lot sizes than the inner, more developed suburbs.
10. The possibility and circumstances of judicial intervention are discussed at pp. 1433-
87 infra.
11. Some communities do, however, bargain with developers. See ASPO, supra note
1, at 198. In exchange for a relaxation of lot size minima, the developer may make design
modifications, provide community facilities, or build more expensive homes. James
Rouse, the developer of Columbia new town, got Howard County, Maryland, to relax
its zoning by offering to provide a wide variety of amenities and facilities. But since
subdivision requirements and building codes already allow the suburb to demand much
of what the developer has to give in exchange, the scope for bargaining is limited unless
the development is large or unusual.
The use by the municipality of professional planners also may influence the zoning
choices of the suburb. But to the extent that professional planning ideals conflict with
homeowner interests, they will generally be rejected. See Comment, Parochialism on the
Bay: An Analysis of Land Use Planning in the San Francisco Bay drea, 55 CAL. L. REV.
836, 847 (1967). In any event, "most [planning staff members interviewed felt] that their
job is to plan, not for the region, but for the jurisdiction which employs them." Id. Thus
the notion that homeowners pursue only their interests is a simplification of the process
but not the result.
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the suburbs less prestigious. Large lot zoning serves this exclusionary
purpose by making residency in the suburb more expensive.-
Another frequently cited motive for large lot zoning is that of keep-
ing down the suburb's tax rate. Low and moderate priced single-family
dwellings do not return in taxes what they add to the municipal
budget, particularly the cost of education. Large lot zoning is partly
an effort to "export" these tax-loss homebuyers to other parts of the
region.
1 3
By making the suburb more desired, an increase in the acreage re-
quirement enhances the market value of the owners' homes. Increased
property value is thus both a cause and an effect of the desire for a
rich, white, low-density town. But whether aesthetics, status, or the
dollar is at the root of large lot zoning, it is sufficient, for the purpose
of examining the efficiency of a change in the lot size minimum, to
observe that the change it causes in the aggregate market value of the
homeowners' property reasonably approximates the change in the dol-
lar value that they would put on the choice of lot size requirements.
14
The market value of each homeowner's property will rise as the lot
size minimum is increased, but beyond a certain point each zoning in-
crease will bring a smaller gain to the homeowners. This effect arises
from two sources. First, each unit increase in any one determinant of
market value-e.g., open space-will have a lesser impact on the prop-
erty's market value than the previous unit increase, because one's desire
for any commodity lessens as he acquires more of it. This effect is
known as "diminishing marginal returns." Second, each unit increase
in the lot size will bring a lesser increase in each determinant of market
12. The effect of large lot zoning on the cost of housing in the suburb is discussed at
note 32 infra.
13. See SPREAD CrrY, supra note 1, at 31. This "gain" for homeowners., hov.'ever, is
more than offset by losses to others; to provide the same level of services, the total
expenditures of all municipalities in the metropolis will be greater with large lot zoning
than with smaller average lot sizes. This is so because the prime determinants of local
government expenditures are the number of people and the sie of the area to be served.
Large lot zoning does not decrease the total metropolitan population, but forces govern-
ment to provide sewerage, water, and local roads over a wider area. Moreover, large lot
zoning causes developers to "leapfrog" strictly zoned area and build on the remote but
more leniently zoned sections. "M[The cost of extending utilities to the ouulig develop-
ment-which must include sewers, water lines, and streets large enough to serve the
intervening area when that develops--increases the public costs enormously . .-
ASPO, supra note 1, at 196. Since te net impact on the metropolitan ic is negatie,
the analysis of large lot zoning may ignore these local budgetary considerations, re-
membering, however, that they strengthen the argument that large lot zoning 
is
inefficient.
14. The dollar value that a homeowner would put on the fatisfaction he 
deries
from his home will be no lower than the home's market value. Otherwise, he would 
sell.
Because changes in the lot size requirement will have similar effects on 
a home's market
value and on the satisfaction that it produces for its occupant, market ialue is 
used
here as a convenient proxy for the satisfaction that a homeowner gets from his 
home.
1421
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value; e.g., an increase from two to three acres creates less additional
open space than an increase from one to two acres. Thus, each unit
increase in lot size will create less of the desired amenity, and each unit
increase in the desired amenity will bring less additional satisfaction to
the homeowner.
In addition, the marginal increase in market value will drop rather
sharply when the zoning requirement passes the lot size of existing
homes, because prohibiting lot sizes smaller than those existing will
usually satisfy the desire to exclude families of lower status. When the
lot size becomes very large, the returns will be further diminished by
positive disadvantages, including increased isolation and a greater need
for automobiles and chauffeuring of children.' 5 Thus the aggregate
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Figure 1 represents graphically an estimation of the impact on the
aggregate value of homeowners' property of applying various acreage
requirements to the suburb's presently undeveloped land.10 Curve 0
15. Under present zoning, the average lot is so large that the vast majority of
residents necessarily will live beyond walking distance of schools, shopping, churches,
and friends. Trips for such everyday purposes will be predominantly by auto. In the
new spread-city, pedestrians and school children on bicycles will be scarce indeed.
SPRaD Crry, supra note 1, at 21.
16. The curves drawn in Figures 1-3 are only graphical illustrations of the directions
in which, and the rates at which, the total satisfaction of the various groups can be ex-
pected to vary with given changes in the minimum lot size requirement of the hypothetical
suburb. The exact contours and height of the curves shown do not purport to represent
any real situation, or to be verifiable by existing empirical data.
1422
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rises to the right, reflecting the increased value to homeowners of
larger lot size requirements. It is concave toward the horizontal axis,
reflecting the diminishing returns to homeowners from increases in
the minimum permissible lot size.
17 Point E on the horizontal axis
marks the average lot size of existing homes. The suburb at the behest
of homeowners will want to increase the lot size requirement as long
as curve 0 continues to rise, but will be limited at some point by the
threat of judicial intervention. This point, represented by Z in Figure
1, will be larger than the lot size of existing homes (point E), given
present judicial standards in zoning challenge cases.
s The suburb
will zone for minimum lot size Z in preference to any smaller size.
The choice of a lot size requirement also affects the satisfaction that
the zoned land produces for homebuyers.
10 An increase in the mini-
mum lot size will bring more satisfaction to each purchaser of a sub-
urban lot, by increasing both the size of the lot itself and the size of
17. Curve 0 simplifies the homeowners' interest near the far left side of the graph.
Below some very small lot size requirement, homeowners will care little about 
further
decreases in the lot size requirements because such decreases will have little impact 
on
the density of construction. That is, a point will come where almost 
all individuals
buying homes will want lots bigger than those called for in the 
ordinance. The fla.
tening effect that this would have on curve 0, and all the other 
curves in figures 1-3,
is omitted because it occurs at much smaller lot sizes than those under discussion.
18. Judicial remedies for parties aggrieved by large lot zoning, and the standards
applied by the courts, are discussed at pp. 1433-37 infra.
19. Although the "homebuyer" category includes all those in the market for suburban
homes, the analysis equates the change in total satisfaction of all homebuyers 
with
the change in satisfaction only of those homebuyers who will occupy the 
zoned land
after the change in minimum lot sizes. This ignores the change in total satisfaction
of those homebuyers who will occupy land in other parts of the metropolis, 
a change
produced by the shift in population, in the case of a lot size decrease, from those 
other
s-to the suburbs. An analysis of the efficiency of the zoning change can ignore th.es
effects only on the assumption that the land left by the homebuyers will produce
satisfaction for others as great or almost as great as the satisfaction it previously produced
for the now-departed homebuyers.
Many uses will compete for this land. First, homebuyers who do not get into 
the
suburb will now occupy land with a lower density population. Second, cit)dwellers 
ill
be able to move into some of this abandoned land. The only effects on cit)dwellers
discussed in the text, p. 1428 infra, derive from their having fewer homebu)'er 
neigh-
bors, not from their moving into new, more desirable residences. Third, commercial,
industrial, and farming uses will also compete for some of the abandoned land.
Normally, we would not expect these users to gain as much satisfaction from 
this
land as the homebuyers previously did. Otherwise, they would have outbid 
the home-
buyers for its use in the first place. This assumes, however, that the market works 
well,
allocating each parcel to its most productive use. But as to this land, there 
are good
reasons for believing that the market has not worked well. First, segregation 
within the
city keeps poorer citydwellers from many homebuyer-occupied areas although 
the city-
dwellers could outbid the homebuyers if given a chance. Second, it will be shown 
(see
note 23 infra) that fewer residents on a densely populated piece of land 
can sometimes
result in more total satisfaction from its use, because the market has ignored 
peoplc s
concerns about crowding.
Thus, after a curb in large lot zoning, the land which homebuyers abandon in moving
to the suburbs may well find an equally productive use. Therefore, 
in arguing that
smaller lot size requirements would be efficient, it is assumed that the gain 
to ome-
buyers will not be niminished by a decrease in the productivity of non-suburban 
land.
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those that surround it.20 As the lot size increases, however, the home-
buyer will derive diminishing marginal returns both from being sur-
rounded by increasingly large lots and from owning a larger lot him-
self. Thus the dollar value that an individual homebuyer places on a
lot of the minimum allowed size rises with each increase in the zoning
requirement, but by a smaller amount each time.
While bringing increased satisfaction to each individual purchaser,
an increase in the minimum lot size also reduces the number of lots
and hence the number of homebuyers who can live in the suburb.
Only those homebuyers who are successful in purchasing a lot will
derive satisfaction from the suburb's land,21 and at some point decreas-
ing numbers of successful homebuyers will begin to have a bigger im-
pact on the satisfaction of homebuyers as a class than will the increased
satisfaction of each individual homebuyer who succeeds in purchasing
a larger lot.22 This point is represented by lot size M in Figure 2.2-
Curve B, an estimation of how total homebuyer satisfaction varies with
changes in the lot size requirement, reaches a peak at point M. Lot size
increases beyond M will have increasingly negative effects on home-
20. The homebuyer will share part of his satisfaction with the owner of the vacantland through the purchase price of his lot. The price level does not affect the total satisfac-tion produced by the land for the parties to the sale, but it does affect how they divide itbetween themselves. The landowner's gross revenue is dependent upon the size of thedollar value placed upon the land by the homebuyer. His interests are therefore con-current with, and are treated as subsumed under, the homebuyer's satisfaction. Theanalysis of homebuyer interests as including those of landowners eliminates from tilegraphical presentation in Figure 2 any effects of a change in lot size requirements uponthe distribution of income between landowners and homebuyers. See note 8 supra. Onesuch effect, however, is considered at p. 1426 infra.
21. But see note 20 supra.
22. Of course, some homebuyers will prefer two-acre zoning, and will not move intoa suburb zoned at one acre. Since the efficiency analysis deals only with total satisfac-tion, it is irrelevant that the satisfaction goes to different members of the group;aggregate satisfaction, not its distribution, is the economic variable at issue. Cf. note 8
Supra.
23. Although homebuyers could legally choose lots of size M when the acreage re-quirement is less than M, they will not do so, and hence curve B is not horizontal frompoint M to the vertical axis. The reason is that, without zoning, homebuyers actingindividually will not choose lots of a size that they collectively want. Each homebuyerwants others to buy large lots but knows that the amount of land that they buy willbe independent of the amount of land he buys. Therefore, with land bringing diminish.ing returns to him, he will buy a lot so large that the worth to himself alone of buyingan additional fraction of an acre is just less than its cost. However, his buying thatextra fraction of an acre is worth something to other homebuyers, so that its worth toall of them together exceeds its price to the individual homebuyer. Thus, all home.buyers would be better off if they could pay each other to buy more land, or if theycould agree among themselves to do so. Zoning, by accomplishing the same thing assuch agreements without cost, benefits the homebuyers so long as the minimum lot sizedoes not go above that collectively desired. For a similar argument often made tojustify urban renewal, see J. ROTHENBERG, ECONOMIC EVALUA*ION OF URBAN REN2mAL
40-42 (1967).Zoning also benefits the homebuyers by removing from their real estate investmentthe risk that the surrounding land will be developed more densely than expected.
1424
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buyer satisfaction, as the effect of decreasing numbers of available lots
outweighs the effect of declining marginal increases in satisfaction to
each individual homebuyer.24
Data on the impact of large lot zoning upon land values is consis-
tent with this conclusion. In some suburbs, minimal lots in an area
zoned for a given acreage are priced almost as high and sometimes
higher than minimal lots in areas zoned for twice the acreage.Y
The lot size at which total homebuyer satisfaction is maximized
will be considerably smaller than the minimum lot size which home-
owners want and get. In fact, lot size M is likely to be smaller than the
average lot size of existing homes (point E) which, as previously
noted,2 6 is smaller than the homeowners' preferred zoning require-
ment Z. Even if existing homes were built so long ago that developers
were not forced to choose lot sizes larger than those most profitable,
and hence those which maximized satisfaction to homebuyers, popula-
tion growth and transportation improvement in most metropolitan
areas will have increased the demand for and desirability of suburban
24. Curve B will reverse the direction of its curve as the lot size requirement becomesvery large. The curve will never cross the horizontal axis, since the land will always
produce some satisfaction for at least one homebuyer or landowner (whose interests are
subsumed under those of homebuyers- see note 20 supra).
25. Cf. South Western Regional Planning Association, Hotuing, 6 TscFr. REP. 69-70(on Connecticut); ASPO, supra note 1, at 214-15; 3 DOUGLAS, supra note 3, at 1-39.
The South Western Regional Planning Association asserts that part of the reason for
the smaller lots being worth more per square foot is their being located closer to com-
munity facilities. But it is large lot zoning that produces the scarcity of community
facilities in what are now the more remote sections of these towns.
26. See p. 1423 supra.
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land, and thus have heightened the most profitable density of the
land.
27
The loss which zoning at lot size Z rather than at M imposes on
homebuyers is measured by the decline in curve B between M and Z.
Likewise, the amount by which homeowners benefit from zoning at Z
rather than M is measured by the rise in curve 0 between M and Z.
Regardless of whether the benefit to homeowners exceeds the loss to
homebuyers, the decision is the homeowners', and they will choose Z.
That the hypothetical suburb competes with others impels it to
make full use of its powers to raise the minimum lot size. The suburb
that falls behind in the zoning race may quickly become a target for
mass developers catering to the less wealthy spectrum of the homebuy-
ing market, thus burdening it with unusually fast development and a
loss of relative prestige.28 If all suburbs, however, were forced to zone
for smaller lot sizes, the otherwise excluded homebuyers would dis-
tribute themselves more evenly, and no one suburb would suffer a
great loss of relative prestige or desirability.29 Therefore, by removing
much of the incentive for large lot zoning, a curb on all suburbs
rather than only one would entail a much smaller cost to the home-
owners of the hypothetical suburb.
Homebuyers too are interested in the relative status afforded by a
suburban residence. A minimum lot will produce more satisfaction for
the homebuyer where all suburbs have the same minimum than where
other suburbs continue to zone for large lot sizes. A curb on all sub-
urbs, therefore, would increase the total satisfaction derived by home-
buyers from the hypothetical suburb's land more than would a curb
on the hypothetical suburb alone. The curb on all suburbs will also
increase the total supply of developable lots, reducing the price of the
land and hence increasing the homebuyers' satisfaction per dollar
paid. 30 One measure of the importance of this distributional effect is
that over a twenty year period, during which exclusionary zoning spread
27. R. VERNON, METROPOLIS 1985, at 181-86 (1963).
28. See R. VERNON, THE MYTH AND REAI_ ry OF OUR URBAN PRtoamxis 64 (1962);
R. WOOD, 1400 GovERNmErNs 112 (1961).
29. It is the social status of the residents and the cost of housing, not the density of
development, that determines the prestige of an area. BABcocK & BOSSELNAN, supra note
2, at 1068-69 (1963). In the past, medium density suburbs had "the reputation of being
of the best character ..... Id. at 1068 n.197.
30. The satisfaction of homebuyers "per dollar paid" implies an effect up on income
distribution between homebuyers and landowners, and is thus not reflected In curve B.
See note 20 supra.
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rapidly, the raw land component in the price of new housing more
than doubled.31
The impact of large lot zoning extends beyond the boundaries of
the suburb itself. By increasing the cost of living in the suburba and
reducing the number of building sites, large lot zoning decreases the
number of homebuyers that can reside in the suburbs. Of those ex-
cluded, some want and can afford a home in the more distant areas
that do not yet have tough zoning ordinances. Upon arrival, however,
they will press for their own large lot zoning. They will pay a price
for their displacement, a price which is reflected in the homebuyer
curve for the hypothetical suburb.33 Some will have to limit their
choice of jobs to the suburbs. Others, who continue to work down-
town, will devote more time and money to commuting, including the
tolls and gasoline taxes that pay for the necessarily larger expressways.-"
Most excluded homebuyers, however, will probably live in the cen-
tral city. This higher density of city population puts a cost on people
who would not move to the suburb under any form of zoning, people
whom we have termed "citydwellers." An analysis of the efficiency of
31. Over a twenty year period, land costs rose from between 8 and 12 percent to 20
per cent of the total cost of a home. URBAN LAND INsrrrur, NEwv APPROACHES To Rst-
DENTIAL LAND DEV LOP..mmr, 4 TEmr. BULL. (1961).
32. Large lot zoning raises housing costs in various ways, including: (1) Transporta.
tion. By spreading out travel destinations and making mass transportation less feasible.
large lot zoning increases the need for second and third cars. Assuming that keeping and
runng an automobile costs $1,000 per year, a pattern of development which caues
one to purchase an extra car would entail a cost more than equal to a $10.000 increase
in the purchase price of the home. Cf. ASPO, supra note 1, at 213. (2) Maintenance.
Large lot zoning increases the size of the grounds to be cared for, and may convert what
could be an enjoyable pastime into a contract with a gardening firm. (3) Property taxes.
Whatever its impact on the tax rate, large lot zoning increases each new residents tax
base, and hence his tax bill, by forcing him to buy more land. (4) Raw land. Large lot
zoning of course forces homebuyers to purchase more land for their residence. The
measure of the increased expenditure entailed thereby is not simply the difference in cot
between a small lot and a larger lot in a town with varied lot sizes; by reducing the abso-
lute number of lots available, large lot zoning generally inflates land prices. (5) Building
and site development costs. Although the point is not undisputed, there is some evidence
to indicate that larger lot sizes cause significantly increased expenditures on home con-
struction and site development. See 3 DoccLAs, supra note 3, at 1-40, 1-12.
33. The dollar value that a homebuyer puts on a lot in the hypothetical suburb re-
flects the desirability and cost of lots elsewhere. Since a lot in a more distant area is one
of his alternatives, the price of such a lot is reflected in the dollar value measured by
curve B.
34. Even a small percentage savings on this score would be significant where, in the
New York region, over $5,000 per additional household must be spent for expressways
to accommodate projected 1960-1985 growth patterns under present zoning. SPREAD CrrV,
supra note 1, at 26. To the extent that user taxes do not suffice to pay for expressways,
their cost will be borne by the public generally.
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large lot zoning must take into account the interests of this group to
the extent that those interests are reducible to dollar terms.
A larger city population has several consequences of importance
which cannot enter into the question of efficiency. It produces a higher
level of demand for housing, which results in higher rents. Increasing
rent levels in the city will have a regressive impact upon the distribu-
tion of income between landlords and tenants. Since the tenants' loss
is the landlords' gain, however, rent levels are not a factor which can
enter the efficiency analysis.Yr Second, excluding homebuyers from
the suburbs forcibly slows the exodus of the middle class from the city.
The resulting ramifications in terms of racial integration and distribu-
tion of political power in the city may be considered good or bad, but
they are not usually thought of in dollar terms, and so must be ex-
cluded from the economic analysis.
In shopping for apartments or houses in the city, however, city-
dwellers do put a dollar value on the amenity of the neighborhood,
and a price tag on this aspect of population density in the city is
therefore realistic. Although it may be possible that some citydwellers
will place a higher value on city dwellings when substantial numbers
of middle class homebuyers remain in the city, it is likely that city-
dwellers as a class will prefer the effects of a greater exodus from the
city, at least as it affects those interests that are reducible to dollar
terms. A denser population decreases the attractiveness of a city dwell-
ing by creating less open space, more traffic-causing noise and danger
to children-, more pollution, and more risk of fire. A reasonable
function of how this valuation is affected by the suburb's choice of
lot size zoning is illustrated by curve C in Figure 3, which declines
steadily as the suburban lot size increases. 0 As a point of reference,
curve C is set at zero dollars at lot size M.
35. See note 8 supra.
36. The shape of curve C will be determined by two competing factors. First, each
unit increase in the lot size minimum will have a smaller impact on the density of
the city population. For example, in a suburb with sixty acres of vacant land, an Increase
in the lot size requirement from one to two acres reduces by thirty the number of home-
buyers who can move into that suburb; a further increase from two to three acres,
however, reduces the number only by ten. Thus one would expect that curve C would
decline to the right but at a decreasing rate. As the lot size increases, however, the impact
on citydweller satisfaction will reflect the converse of diminishing marginal returns--
or alternatively stated, citydwellers will receive diminishing marginal returns from ead
reduction in the minimum lot size. This effect will tend to counterbalance the lessening
impact on city density of each unit increase in the suburban lot size.
For lack of any available data indicating which of these effects is stronger at any
given lot size, and because the actual degree of curvature can have only a very small
impact upon the conclusion, curve C assumes that the effects exactly counterbalance
each other for every lot size increase.
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The most efficient suburban acreage requirement is that lot size at
which the total dollar satisfaction of all groups is maximized. The
total satisfaction produced by suburban land zoned for a given lot size
is measured by the sum of the satisfaction of homeowners, home-
buyers and citydwellers at that lot size. Curve 0 + B + C in Figure 3
represents the total satisfaction of these groups as it is affected by the
changing lot size minima. Total satisfaction is maximized at lot size Q,
the point at which curve 0 + B + C reaches its greatest height. Any
move from Q in either direction will yield larger losses for some
groups than gains for others, and thus Q is the most efficient lot size
for the hypothetical suburb. The most efficient acreage requirement
will, of course, vary among different suburbs.
37
The most efficient minimum lot size (Q) will be smaller than the
lot size requirment which suburbs now choose (Z) if at some point
prior to lot size Z the combined satisfaction of homebuyers and city-
dwellers begins to fall more rapidly than the rise in the satisfaction of
homeowners. This will be the case in the usual suburb if, as previously
argued, Z is larger than E and E larger than Al; curve 0 rises only
slowly beyond E; and curve B dips quickly beyond Al while curve C
declines over the entire range of lot size requirements. The argument
37. The economic analysis excluded a number of considerations dillicult to decal with
in dollar terms. Some of these considerations are outlined at p. 1431 infra.
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that large lot zoning is inefficient is even stronger where the suburb is
largely undeveloped or where the zoned land includes a large vacant
tract. In these cases, a zoning change will have a bigger impact upon
the number of homebuyers who can live in the suburb. Moreover, the
interests of homeowners in a larger zoning requirement will be
smaller, because their interests are partly a function of the number of
homeowners affected by the zoning of any one parcel and their proxim-
ity to the land involved.
The most conservative conclusion which follows from the foregoing
analysis is that the existing zoning mechanism provides no assurance
that it will not produce major inefficiencies. Even this timid conclusion,
however, supports a demand for change in the existing zoning mecha-
nism. Large lot zoning profoundly affects housing, transportation and
employment throughout the metropolis. Even a relatively small error
is a multimillion dollar waste where, for instance, the New York
metropolitan area will spend ninety billion dollars for housing and
highways alone over the next twenty-five years. 3 Too much is at stake
to assume that suburbs will fortuitously produce efficient zoning.
II. Is Large Lot Zoning Desirable?
Even economists do not perceive efficiency as the talisman of public
policy.8 9 A finding that to reduce lot size requirements would be
efficient is no more than a description of the fact that homebuyers and
citydwellers would pay more to achieve it than homeowners would
pay to prevent it. That a change would be efficient does not in itself
imply that the change would produce greater total happiness without
a further, and arbitrary, assumption that a dollar brings the same
satisfaction to all men. One may support a change that imposes a loss
on one man that he values at two dollars in order to give to another
a benefit that he values at one dollar, if, for instance, the one who re-
ceives the benefit is poorer.40 Resolving the question of efficiency,
however, aids the policy-maker by reducing a very complex problem
to two value-bound considerations: the distribution of income and
the non-economic consequences of the reform. If the nonmonetizable
88. SPREAD CITY, supra note 1, at 26-27.
39. See, e.g., J. ROTHENBERG, EcoNoMlic EVALUATION OF URBAN RENEWAL 20-22 (1967);
Comment, The General Welfare, Welfare Economics and Zoning Variances, 38 S. CAL L.
REV. 548, 566 (1965).
40. For the contrary position, see W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION passim (1954).
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effects of a proposed zoning reform are thought to be beneficial, or if
these effects are thought adverse but are outweighed by the advantages
of the reform in terms of efficiency, then the proposed reform is
desirable.41
Important income distribution and non-economic considerations
greatly strengthen the case for reductions in lot size requirements.
As to income distribution, a reform's most profound impact would
be to benefit homebuyers and citydwellers at the expense of the
generally wealthier homeowners. The reform would entail a more
even distribution not of cash but of living space, which government
intervention via zoning has distributed even more regressively than
would the free market. Ironically, then, the redistribution would be
consistent both with the view that has sustained government programs
for the more equal distribution of essentials, and with the view that
the distribution produced by the free market is morally right.4
The probable non-economic consequences of a curb on large lot
zoning also on balance militate in favor of the change. By barring
lower middle-income families, large lot zoning helps maintain the
homogeneous composition of the suburbs, thereby contributing to
segregation by class and color. The population dispersal caused by large
lot zoning forces a greater reliance on the automobile in place of walk-
ing or mass transportation,43 narrows the choice of friends and recrea-
tion within a given travel time, and rapidly consumes what little
countryside still exists within a reasonable distance from the central
city. Higher density development produced by a reduction in the level
of lot size zoning, moreover, would not necessarily bring a reduction
in the values associated with greenery and open space. On the con-
trary, by committing less land to large, private lawns, lower acreage
41. See I.M.D. LrrrLE, A CriquE oF VLFARE EcoNo IICs (2d ed. 1957). Little outlines
the criteria of welfare economics for a desirable economic change, summarized thus:
[Ain economic change is desirable if (a) it would result in a good redistribution
of wealth, and if (b) the potential losers could not profitably bribe the potential
gainers to oppose the change. Two value judgments are presupposed by this cri-
terion. The first is that an individual becomes better off if he is enabled to reach
a position higher up on his order of choice. The second is that the community is
better off if one individual becomes better off, and none worse off.
Id. at 275-76 (footnote omitted). He notes that this criterion assumes no adverse non-
economic changes. Id. at 276 nl. A desirable change to a policyrmaker must of course
take account of non-economic considerations, and for this purpose a third criterion
might be added to those of Little where the non-economic effects of a change are likely
to be significant, as in the case of a change in lot size zoning. A change which is found
undesirable by Little's criteria might nevertheless be a good change if the significance
of non-economic benefits is judged to outweigh the negative economic consequences.
42. For an example of this position as applied to zoning, Cf. Dunham, City Planning:
An Analysis of the Content of the Master Plan, 1 J. LAW & EcoN. 170 (1958).
43. See note 15 supra.
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requirements would leave more land for other uses, including pub-
licly accessible open space provided through parks or cluster zoning.
III. Alternatives to Homeowner Control
Opinions will differ on the desirability of large lot zoning's effects
upon income distribution and non-economic interests. Ideally, society
resolves disputes over such governmental policies in arenas where all
concerned have a voice. In suburban zoning decisions, however, there
is only one effective voice, that of homeowners. This license makes
suburbs unreliable allocators of living space. In choosing how much
of the benefits of zoning to take for themselves, homeowners are largely
free from the discipline of the market place because they do not pay
the full cost of producing what they consume. And even if intersub-
urban competition did not render unfeasible any charitable concern
for homebuyers and citydwellers, individual suburbs lack the com-
petence and motivation to allocate rationally the living space of the
metropolis. In sum,
land use planning in any comprehensive sense really does not exist
in our larger urban areas. What does exist is a complex game of
chess among localities, each attempting to palm off the undesired
applicants for space upon their neighboring communities. This
is warfare, not planning.
44
Abolition of lot size zoning would return the choice of residential
density to the market place. The market cannot, however, produce
decisions which give full attention to the respective interests of all
groups concerned. Without lot size requirements, homebuyers and
landowners will choose the size of building sites without regard to
the interests of homeowners or citydwellers. Moreover, the home-
buyers will fail to maximize their own satisfaction. Each will choose
his lot size without regard to the desire of neighboring homebuyers
that he buy more land. Therefore, acting individually, homebuyers
will tend to chose lots of a size smaller than the one which they collec-
tively desire (lot size M in Figure 2). 45 Unhindered by zoning, the
market will produce a residential density higher than that desired by
either homeowners or homebuyers.
Two factors, however, suggest that the free market may allocate
land better than does the present system of lot size zoning. First, every
44. R. VERNON, THE MYrH AND REAiy oF OUR URBAN PRoaLErds 64 (1902).
45. See p. 1424 supra.
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reduction in suburban lot sizes benefits citydwelers,
1 and these
benefits would tend to offset the losses to homeowners and home-
buyers caused by higher density development. Second, market control
would greatly alleviate the income distributional and non-economic
consequences now produced by large lot zoning, including racial and
economic segregation. Thus, free market allocation might well pro-
duce, on the average, a reasonable approximation of the most desir-
able suburban densities, while there are strong a priori reasons to
believe that homeowner control will not.
But, however desirable its results on the average, abolishing lot size
zoning would substitute haphazard for reason in the case of individual
parcels and would confound planning of public facilities.-" Better
than the abolition of controls would be to invest control in a govern-
mental process designed to consider all interests in the metropolis and
to coordinate land use controls with transportation, public facility and
other intertwined areas of decision-making.
48 Such a system would
entail substantial changes in the structure and relationship of local,
state, and federal governments. The establishment of comprehensive
metropolitan planning, unfortunately, runs strongly-only slightly less
so than the abolition of lot size zoning altogether-against political cur-
rents and parochial sympathies. For the near future, it is not a realistic
possibility.
There are, however, methods of regulating the suburbs' control of
residential density which involve less drastic revisions in current politi-
cal institutions, while holding potential for achieving an approxima-
tion of the efficient and sensible land use patterns which might be
expected from metropolitan planning. The remainder of this Note
will consider judicial, legislative, and administrative alternatives, and
suggest one system of control that will give to all groups concerned
reasonably full and competent attention to their respective interests.
Judicial intervention is the only existing limitation upon a suburb's
power to zone for any lot size it pleases, and the courts are often
looked to for the enforcement of sensible limitations on strict home-
owner control. In a suit by a party aggrieved by a particular lot
size zoning ordinance, the courts may afford relief by striking down
46. See p. 1428 supra.
47. See 3 DOUGLAS, supra note 3, at 1-20.
48. The history and theory of metropolitan planning are traced in Friedmzna, The
Concept of a Planning Region-The Evolution of an Idea in the United States. REGIONAL
DEVELOPiENT AND PLANNING 497 (Friedmann & Alonso eads. 1954).
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the ordinance as it affects the plaintiff. In Euclid v. Ambler Really,49
the Supreme Court suggested that judicial power should limit sub-
urban zoning in the interest of all those whom it affects, forecasting
"cases where the general public interest would so far outweigh the
interest of the municipality that the municipality would not be al-
lowed to stand in the way." 50
Euclid, however, promised more than the courts proved able to
deliver. From the outset, the lack of any serviceable standard against
which to measure the validity of an ordinance frustrates judicial con-
trol of large lot zoning. Statutes which authorize suburbs to zone
typically require only that an ordinance serve "the public interest"
or some equally vague purpose.5' Without an unusually broad reading,
the equal protection clause also hardly confines the suburbs' power to
regulate residential density.52 Only the fifth amendment's injunction
against the taking of property without compensation, a notoriously
clumsy tool,53 has proved a realistic vehicle by which to test the
validity of large lot zoning ordinances.
A rational relationship between the ordinance and the "health,
safety, and general welfare" of the populace will distinguish a "valid
police power regulation" from a "taking without compensation." 4 In-
sofar as the suburb in zoning acts as an agent of the state, the fifth
49. Id. at 390. See also Simon v. Town of Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 565.66, 42 N.E.2d
516, 519 (1942).
50. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
51. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACr
UNDER WHICH MUNICIPALITIES MAY ADOPT ZONING REGULATIONS (1926), reprinted in C.
RATHKOPF, LA'W OF ZONING AND PLANNING 547 (2d ed. 1949):
Section 1. Grant of Power.-For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals, or
the general welfare of the community, the legislative body of cities and incorporatedvillages is hereby empowered to regulate and restrict the height, number of stories,
and size of buildings and other structures, the percentage of lot that may be oc-
cupied, the size of yards, courts, and other open spaces, the density of population,
and the location and use of building, structures, and land for trade, industry,
residence or other purposes.
Sec. 3. Purposes in View.-Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure
safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general wel-
fare; to provide adequate light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to
avoid undue concentration of population; to facilitate the adequate provision of
transportation, water, sewerage, schools, parks, and other public requirements. Such
regulations shall be made with reasonable consideration, among other things, to the
character of the district and its peculiar suitability for particular uses, and with a
view to conserving the value of buildings and encouraging the most appropriate
use of land throughout such municipality.
52. Compare Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and
the Indigent, 21 STAN. L. REv. 767, 785 (1969).
53. See Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness, 80 HARV. L. REv. 1165, 1183-1201
(1967).
54. Vickers v. Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 252, 181 A.2d 129, 140 (1962) (dissenting opin.
ion), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 233 (1963); R. BABCOCK, THE ZONING GAME 108 (1966); 1 Haar,
Regionalism and Realism in Land Use Planning, 105 U. PA. L. REv. 515 (1957).
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amendment would appear to compel the "health, safety, and general
welfare" to be that of the state, not the suburb. If so, the fifth amend-
ment could lead to a kind of rough balancing of the interests of all
the concerned groups. The courts, however, lack the time and expertise
needed to fathom zoning's metropolis-wide implications. Confining
the scope of review to the scope of their ability, judges read "health,
safety, and general welfare" to mean only that of the municipality.55
Although it ignores the magnitude of harm to homebuyers and city-
dwellers, this approach could at least insure that a lot size require-
ment produce some legitimate, substantial benefit for homeowners.
The courts, however, have quite unnecessarily failed effectively to
apply even this modest control on the suburb.
First, the courts have not insisted that the suburb point to a precise,
legitimate purpose for its ordinance.50 Accepted justifications have in-
cluded such catch-alls as "avoiding congestion of the land,"57 or that "a
superior residential district would be the most appropriate use of this
unspoiled district." 8 Most objectionable is the justification of "main-
taining property values."' ' 9 To maintain property values is only to
55. Courts do not so much disclaim an interest in the region as ignore it. E.g., Zyg-
mont v. Greenwich, 152 Conn. 550, 210 A.2d 172 (1965) (4-acre minimum upheld for area
near moderate density housing, industry, and shopping); Flora Realty and Inv. Co. v.
Ladue, 246 S.V.2d 771 (Mo. 1952) (upholding 3-acre minimum); State ex rel. Grant v.
Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 181 N.E.2d 905 (1965) (2-acre zoning justified because, inter
alia, the proposed half-acre use differed from existing local standards); Bilbar Const.
Co. v. Easttown Bd. of Adjmt., 393 Pa. 62, 68-69, 141 A.2d 851, 855 (1958). With prod-
ding, some courts have in recent years begun to take a wider view. E.g.. National Land
and Inv. Co. v. Easttown Bd. of Adjmt., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (195) (4.acre
zoning unconstitutional); Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E. 390 (1959)
(2 acres unconstitutional). Both these latter cases relied upon the exclusionary purpose
of the ordinance. See also Haar, supra note 54, at 524-31.
56. For example, in Bilbar Const. Co. v. Easttown Bd. of Ad mt., 393 Pa. 62. 75, 141
A.2d 851, 856-57 (1958), the court held that the "general welfare* must be regarded as a
valid purpose of zoning, because otherwise the municipality would be too constricted in its
alloiwable purposes. See generally Babcock, Mr. Commissioner, Are You Prepared for
Cross Examination?, PROc.EDINGS OF THE 1962 Iusrrrtu oN PLANNING AND ZONING 155.
57. See the proposed Standard Act of the U.S. Dept. of Commerce, supra note 51.
But see J. GorrmNN, MEGALOPOLIS 179 (1961): "mlhe notion of 'crowding' and tie
'feelings' about it appear as an entirely subjective matter."
58. Senior v. New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 535, 153 A.2d 415, 417-18 (1959), appeal dis-
missed, 863 U.S. 143 (1960). The court felt that it could appropriatel' consider, in de-
ciding the constitutionality of the zoning ordinance, the fact that the town had the
highest per capita income in the United States.
59. See, e.g., Flora Realty and Inv. Co. v. Ladue, 246 S.W.2d 771, 779 (fo. 1952);
Vickers v. Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 248, 181 A.2d 129, 138 (1962); Standard Act quoted
note 51 supra. For strong criticism of this justification, see Williams, Planning Law and
Democratic Living, 20 LAW & CoNTEntS. PROB. 317, 334 (1955).
No less pernicious is the argument that the town does not have tie requisite public
facilities to accommodate more newcomers. See Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 2, at
1081. Courts often accept this argument, even when advanced by a rich suburb, without
a showing why the town cannot provide the facilities or why necessary provision for
those excluded should fall upon some other town. See, e.g., Zygmont v. Greenwich 152
Conn. 550, 553, 210 A.2d 172, 174 (1965); Queen Anne's County v. Miles, 246 Md. 355,
372, 228 A.2d 450, 459 (1967). But see National Land and Inv. Co. v. EasLtown Bd. of
Adjmt., 419 Pa. 504, 533, 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965).
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satisfy the desires of potential purchasers of the homeowners' prop-
erty, which may include keeping out poor or black homebuyers.
Where an ordinance really does enhance property values via some
legitimate public purpose, the suburb can, and should be made to,
justify its zoning in terms of that purpose rather than in terms of its
effect on the real estate market.
The suburb may also hide the lack of a proper purpose behind the
hefty presumption of validity with which courts endow its ordi-
nances.60 The suburb has expertise in judging the impact of a zoning
ordinance, but can offer no assurance that it has used this expertise
impartially. Unlike zoning cases of purely local concern, where a court
has some reason to say that the local government is "presumably repre-
senting a majority of the inhabitants and voicing their will,"01 the
suburb in zoning for minimum lot sizes represents only a tiny fraction
of the population whose interests are affected by the ordinance. With-
out sitting in judgment on the efficacy of a local government in reflect-
ing the will of its constituents, courts can distinguish large lot zoning
cases, where the suburb deserves no more credence than any private
litigant, from the usual legislative and administrative reviews by the
absence of any pretense that the suburb in its lot size zoning function
represents even a majority of those concerned.6 2
The gentle treatment of large lot zoning results partly from courts'
misconception of what is at stake. The adversary process brings before
the judge a suburb and a developer or land speculator, not the home-
buyers or citydwellers. Thus judicial opinions, understandably, ob-
serve that a decision in favor of the suburb would promote values
associated with decent housing, while a decision in favor of the de-
veloper would yield only a quick, windfall profit. 03 Although this
60. The burden of proof put on plaintiffs in zoning challenge cases is a major ob.
stacle to effective judicial review of large lot zoning ordinances.
The factual information needed to show [the) significance of exclusionary practices
simply does not exist in most areas and the cost to a private litigant of obtaining It
would prove prohibitive. .. . The result of all these factors is that even some of the
most outrageous exclusionary practices go unchecked by any institution outside the
local government itself.
3 DOUGLAS, supra note 3, at 1-50 to 1-51. See also Vickers v. Gloucester, 37 N.J. 232, 257-58,
181 A.2d 129, 143 (1962) (dissenting opinion).
61. Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 389 (1926).
62. Another argument for withholding any presumption of validity is that large lot
zoning involves questions of economic and racial discrimination as well as economic
regulation. See Sager, supra note 52, at 785.
63. See, e.g., Senior v. New Canaan, 146 Conn. 531, 535, 153 A.2d 415, 417 (1959);
State ex rel. Grant v. Kiefaber, 114 Ohio App. 279, 290, 181 N.E.2d 905, 913 (1960). "The
dispute is viewed as a dialogue between two parties, in which the developer Is pictured
as a money-grubbing baron (as he may be) and the village as the exclusive repository of
the public interest." Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 2, at 1084. See also, BIAcocX, Tnia
ZONING G.mE 108-109 (1966); 3 DOUGLAS, supra note 3, at 1-50.
Some courts, however, take a broader view. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Bd.
of Adjmt., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1966).
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benefit to the developer is true in the individual case, the general
application of stricter standards on review would actually have the
effect of making decent housing cheaper and more widely available.
These limitations on the efficacy of judicial control do not mean
that courts give suburbs a carte blanche. An unspoken rule of reason
appears to have emerged. Courts seem to look upon an acreage require-
ment with particular suspicion where it greatly exceeds the lot size of
nearby homes.64 Where an ordinance pertains to relatively unde-
veloped sections, so that no nearby homes provide a standard of com-
parison, judges often compare its severity with the larger lot size
minima prevailing in similar areas in the state.6 As inter-suburban
competition results in upzoning to the fuzzy borders of legality, how-
ever, the lot size minima which serve the courts as a standard of
comparison continue to increase.
Although the courts could have a more beneficial impact than they
now do, their lack of time and expertise will always foreclose them
from providing more than the grossest of checks on suburban control
of minimum acreage zoning,6 and in the absence of legislative action it
is likely that the suburbs will continue their largely unfettered zoning
discretion. It cannot be said, however, that the legislatures that estab-
lished the existing decision-making process in the 1920's and 30's
intended the suburbs to make regional policy through large lot zoning,
where even in the-following decade one acre zoning was rare.67
Recognizing the inability of courts to control large lot zoning, critics
have focused on two alternate devices: a statutory ceiling on lot size
zoning, and the establishment of a "zoning review board" as an admin-
istrative subsidiary of the state. While each of these measures would
help to check the existing virtually unrestrained tendencies of the
suburbs, neither alone is fully satisfactory.
64. See, e.g., Hamer v. Ross, 59 Cal.2d 776, 382 P.2d 375, 31 Cal. Rptr. 335 (1963);
LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Cook County, 28 Ill.2d 497, 500, 192 N.E.2d 909. 911 (1963);
LaSalle Nat. Bank v. Highland Park, 27 I.2d 350, 351-52, 189 N.E.2d 302. 304 (1963);
Aronson v. Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 599, 195 N.E.2d 341, 342 (1964). But see Zygmont v.
Greenvich, 152 Conn. 550, 210 A.2d 172 (1965).
As a corollary, courts appear to look upon lot size minima with favor when they are
comparable to neighboring development or the zoning on neighboring land. See. e.g.,
Flora Realty & Inv. Co. v. Ladue, 246 S.AV.2d 771, 776 (Mo. 1952); Fischer v. Bedminster
Twp., 11 NJ. 194, 198, 93 A.2d 378, 383 (1952); State ex. rel. Grant v. Kiefaber, 114
Ohio App. 279, 294, 181 N.E.2d 905, 915-16 (1960).
65. See, eg., Fischer v. Bedminster Twp., 11 NJ. 194, 198, 93 A.2d 378, 383 (1952);
Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 564, 42 N.E.2d 516, 518 (1942).
66. Another difficulty with depending upon courts to hold suburbs in check is that
suburbs' decisions, made by "scattered groups of lay decision-makers," have been little
affected by judicial precedent: "One of the most significant results of this fractured
decision-making process is that the injunctions of the judiciary have only nominal im.
pact upon the decision makers." R. BABcocK, THE ZONING GAMX 13 (1966).
67. Urban land Institute, supra note 1, at 7.
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By establishing a statutory ceiling on lot size zoning, the legislature
would impose essentially a single lot size requirement on all suburban
land, despite a wide variation in the most desirable residential density
among suburban areas. Given the motivations of homeowners,
suburbs would zone to the maximum permissible lot size, and the
probable tendency of courts to take the ceiling as a legislatively im-
posed level of "reasonableness" could negate the possibility of effec-
tive judicial control. And it is unlikely that a state legislature would
impose a ceiling low enough to affect any but the most egregious of
existing lot size minima, thus continuing to permit the exclusion of
moderate income homebuyers.
A statewide review board would replace trial level courts in the
procedure for challenging zoning ordinances. With proper staffing, its
specialization would give it the expertise that courts lack.08 But unless
the legislature sets standards for resolving the conflicts between the
interests of the suburbs and the interests of the rest of the metropolis,
the board would devolve its own standards piecemeal in a series of
cases each of which lacks the apparent significance and full representa-
tion of affected parties necessary to achieve a proper balancing of
interests. In this ad hoc, sub silentio process, homeowners would exert
an influence disproportionate to the importance of their interests.
Especially where critical policy decisions are of such low visibility,
regulatory agencies naturally tend to see the "public interest" through
glass clouded by the interests of those best organized to press their
cause. In any given case, the review board would have the choice of
accommodating several thousand wealthy homeowners represented by
the local government, or a few-albeit rich-landowners and perhaps
millions of unorganized homebuyers and citydwellers each of whom
has a miniscule stake in the outcome of that one case.
It is far better that the state legislature set standards in a single,
high-visibility proceeding. Striking the balance between the compet-
ing interests requires dealing with large lot zoning's income distribu.
tional and non-economic dimensions, value questions traditionally re-
served for the political process. With the zoning of all land at stake,
the interests of suburb and city will appear clearly, and the various
affected groups can press their case through political representation.
Rather than establishing an inflexible statutory ceiling, however,
the legislature might combine the best features of both the legislative
68. Existing municipal boards of zoning appeals have been justifiably criticized as
ill-equipped to produce farsighted decisions. See Note, Administrative Discretion in
Zoning, 82 HARV. L. REv. 668, 673-76 (1969).
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and administrative processes by itself establishing a single lot size as a
benchmark from which individual suburbs, supervised by a zoning
review board, could deviate in accordance with prescribed standards.
The benchmark (of, say, one acre) would set an upper limit on lot
size requirements, but suburbs would be permitted to petition the
review board for authorization to set a higher requirement in certain
areas. The board would grant or deny such a petition by applying to
the particular circumstances general guidelines provided by the legis-
lature. On the other hand, individuals aggrieved by an ordinance
requiring one acre or less could petition the review board for a reduc-
tion in the lot size requirement for a particular parcel. This petition
would also be considered on the basis of general legislative guidelines
describing the considerations which should dictate zoning for less than
one acre.69
By allowing controlled flexibility in either direction, the legislature
could set its benchmark lower than the level of any single statutory
ceiling that it would be willing to enact. In addition, by allowing
administrative rather than cumbersome and ineffective judicial re-
view, a realistic possibility would exist in many instances for securing
lot size requirements lower than the benchmark. Such a process could
therefore be expected significantly to increase the number and hetero-
geneity of homebuyers who can live in the suburbs.
The most difficult task would be to formulate the guidelines
to be used by the review board. Since the ceiling set by the legisla-
ture would represent the desired lot size for all areas on the average,
the function of standards guiding administrative authorization of
higher or lower lot size ordinances is to identify not how much, but
which land is suited to either lower or higher density than that called
for by the ceiling. With the overall balancing of economic, non-
economic and distributional considerations included in the ceiling,
the standards would focus only on characteristics that distinguish one
area from others. For example, the standards would not include the
effect of smaller lots on the town's tax rate, because houses on small
lots, wherever located, are tax losers.70 The town which feels itself
deserving of lot size zoning higher than that prevailing elsewhere
69. Haar suggests that the priorities to be applied by a zoning review board be worked
out via a regional planning body. Haar, supra note 54, at 533-35. He does not suggest.
however, what technical criteria an expert body could apply to resolve Ehe many essen-
tially political conflicts between the interested groups. Babcock suggests that the state
legislature set forth criteria much more detailed than those found in Ete usual zoning
enabling act, and that a commission should enforce the application of those criteria.
R. BABcocK, THE ZONxuc GAmm 159-73 (1966).
70. See p. 1421 supra.
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"should be required to show why, among all the towns of the region,
it deserves to be set aside as a low-density reservation." 71
In order to be granted authorization for a lot size ordinance above
the one-acre benchmark level, a suburb should be required to demon-
strate at least (1) that the area to be zoned includes only land already
highly developed; (2) that the proposed lot size requirement does not
exceed the average lot size of existing homes in the area;72 and (3) that
zoning within the one-acre ceiling would reduce the market value of
existing homes substantially below their value at the time the ceiling
was set by the legislature.73
A large-lot suburb which is nearly fully developed prior to enact-
ment of the statutory ceiling, with scattered undeveloped parcels some
distance from the town center, might easily justify a lot size require-
ment higher than one acre. And for such a town, the higher require-
ment may actually more closely approximate the most efficient lot
size, since the homeowners' interests will be strong and the home-
buyers and citydwellers little affected by the ordinance.
On the other hand, the considerations which call for the review
board's ordering a lot size requirement less than the ceiling would be
(1) existence of large undeveloped parcels in the area to be zoned;
(2) a relatively small average lot size of existing homes; (3) the absence
of evidence that smaller lot size zoning will cause a significant decrease
in the market value of existing homes; (4) easy access to shopping,
mass transportation and centers of employment; 4 and (5) the absence
of topographical features making construction of higher density hous-
ing unusually expensive.
The latter two considerations are relevant to the attractiveness of
the land to lower-income homebuyers. In an area which meets these
71. Babcock & Bosselman, supra note 2, at 1081.
72. The benefit to homeowners from increases in the lot size requirement will grow
much more slowly when the requirement passes the average lot size of existing homes.
See p. 1422 supra.
73. In determining whether zoning within the ceiling will substantially diminish tie
market value of existing homes, the review board should consider the effect upon market
value of zoning at very high densities as well as the effect of zoning at the benchmark
level. A suburb should not be allowed to justify zoning at three acres on the basis of
avoiding a substantial loss in market value where by zoning for very high density or for
multi-family uses the suburb could actually increase the market value of existing prop-
erty.
74. For a similar suggestion, see 3 DouGLAs, supra note 3, at II-25 to 11-26. This
standard would serve as a counter measure to the suburbs' practice of "fiscal zoning,"
i.e. the use of zoning powers to attract tax profit-makers, such as industrial and com-
mercial uses, and to exclude tax losers such as poor families. Fiscal zoning is undesirable
because it misallocates resources and leads to an unconscionable disparity in tax rates
among various municipalities in the metropolis. The standard would make the town
that wants the tax profit-makers to take the tax losers as well.
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criteria, the satisfaction produced by the land for homebuyers will be
relatively greater than the satisfaction produced by land in areas less
accessible or less suitable for construction of moderate priced homes.
When the review board finds that high density development is appro-
priate, it should have the option of requiring zoning that permits town
houses or apartments as well as houses on small lots. This would allow
homebuyers who so desire to avoid the extra construction costs of a
given sized dwelling unit in a single-family form. In addition, the open
space otherwise consumed in the narrow corridors between houses on
small lots could be used for larger front or back yards.
Even if the legislature and the review board seek expert advice,
limitations on our knowledge of the urban economy would make the
initial drafting of the ceiling and standards partly a matter of guess-
work. Despite the legislative guesswork, however, this approach would
lessen zoning's unsettling effect on the land market because the board's
specialization, the ceiling, and the statutory standards would make for
more consistent and more predictable decisions than courts now pro-
duce. Control by the suburbs alone, of course, requires no guesswork,
but only because it makes no attempt to apply what knowledge society
does have toward the realization of what society collectively wants.
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